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Abstract
In this study, I examine the determinants and consequences of quarterly management guidance of
key performance indicators (KPIs). I use a novel dataset of 457 firm-quarter observations in the
airline industry and hand-collect information on the existence and properties of quarterly KPI
guidance. Specifically, I collect data on quarterly KPI guidance for three KPIs used in airline the
industry: available seat miles, revenue per available seat mile, and cost per available seat mile.
Consistent with managers using quarterly KPI guidance to reduce analyst uncertainty, I find that
managers are more likely to provide quarterly KPI guidance when initial analyst earnings per share
(EPS) forecasts errors are large. I also find that firms with high analyst following, high growth
prospects, and low financial performance are more likely to provide quarterly KPI guidance. I next
examine whether quarterly KPI guidance is associated with improvements analyst EPS forecasts
and find that quarterly KPI guidance is associated with reductions in analyst EPS forecast errors
which results in more accurate analyst estimates of EPS at the end of the quarter. Together, these
results demonstrate that quarterly KPI guidance is an alternative form of guidance that managers
can use to reduce information asymmetry with analysts by providing forward-looking information
about the underlying operations of the firm.
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1. Introduction
Earnings guidance is one of the primary ways that managers convey information about
future firm performance to shareholders. However, there has been considerable debate on whether
managers should provide quarterly earnings guidance to investors. Proponents of quarterly
earnings guidance argue that guidance is useful because it allows managers to improve investors'
ability to predict future earnings, increases analyst following, and decreases the risk of litigation.1
In contrast, critics argue that quarterly earnings guidance is costly to produce, promotes managerial
myopia.2 Although prior research finds evidence in support of both arguments, in practice, many
firms are doing away with this disclosure.3 While the provision of quarterly earnings guidance has
declined, management guidance for key performance indicators (KPIs) has increased
considerably.4 Unlike financial performance measures, KPIs incorporate information about firm
performance that is unique to the operations of the firm such as subscriber growth in the
entertainment service industry and available seat miles in the airline industry.
While firms are increasing their guidance on KPIs, it is not clear whether quarterly KPI
guidance influences expectations about future financial performance. Thus, in this study, I
investigate an alternative mechanism through which managers can provide forward-looking
information about future financial performance to market participants, quarterly KPI guidance.

1

See The Case for Guidance by Baruch Lev in the Wall Street Journal. Available at:
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203391104577124243623258110
2
For example, in a Wall Street Journal editorial written in 2018, Warren Buffett and Jamie Dimon state “we are
encouraging all public companies to consider moving away from providing quarterly earnings-per-share guidance. In
our experience, quarterly earnings guidance often leads to an unhealthy focus on short-term profits at the expense of
long-term strategy, growth and sustainability.” Short-Termism is Harming the Economy available at:
https://www.wsj.com/articles/short-termism-is-harming-the-economy-1528336801?ns=prod/accounts-wsj
3
The percentage of firms in the S&P 500 providing quarterly EPS guidance dropped from 36% in 2010 to 27.8% in
2016. See Moving Beyond Quarterly Guidance: A Relic of the Past
available at:
https://www.fcltglobal.org/docs/default-source/publications/moving-past-quarterly-guidance---a-relic-of-thepast.pdf?sfvrsn=77a9268c_2
4
I find the percentage of firms that provide quarter KPI guidance in the airline industry increased from 41% of firms
in 2008 to 98% of firms in 2017.

Specifically, I examine the determinants of quarterly KPI guidance and whether KPI guidance is
associated with improvements in analyst estimates of earnings in the airline industry.
Historically, KPIs were used solely for internal performance evaluation, however, public
disclosure of KPIs is becoming more prevalent. For example, former SEC Commissioner Kara M.
Stein states that “Alternative measures—such as non-GAAP metrics and KPIs—that were once
used sparingly, now appear in a host of documents and situations, including roadshows, analyst
meetings, and quarterly earnings calls.”5 In addition to the increasing use of KPIs in firm filings,
managers are also starting to provide guidance on KPIs along with, or in the place of, earnings
guidance. For example, in the airline industry, management KPI guidance is discussed in earnings
reports alongside financial measures in both firm filings and press coverage.6 In order to examine
why firms are increasingly providing quarterly KPI guidance, I first examine the determinants of
quarterly KPI guidance.
Next, I examine the consequences of firms providing quarterly KPI guidance. Specifically,
I first examine whether management guidance is associated with analyst earnings forecasts errors.
There are several reasons why quarterly KPI guidance would be useful for analysts forecasting
earnings. First, prior research provides evidence that analysts incorporate information from
management guidance of earnings into their earnings estimates (e.g., Waymire 1986; Baginsky
and Hassell 1990; and Williams 1996). While quarterly KPI guidance does not directly provide
analysts with management’s expectations of realized earnings, it does provide them with
management’s expectations about the underlying operations of the firm that contributes to their

5

Available at https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-stein-102318
For example, in their coverage of United Airlines Holding’s 3rd quarter earnings announcement, CNBC reported
that “Revenue per available seat mile, a key industry metric that measures how much an airline is earning for each
seat it flies a mile, rose 1.7%, in line with United’s forecast over the summer. United expects this metric to rise no
more than 2% in the fourth quarter.” Available at https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/15/united-airlines-q3-2019earnings.html
6

2

ability to generate future earnings. Second, prior research shows that management has an
information advantage over analysts when performance resides at the firm level (Hutton et al.
2012). Because KPIs are specific measures idiosyncratic to the firm or industry, managers should
be able to form more accurate predictions of future realizations of KPIs in their quarterly KPI
guidance. Third, prior literature finds that periodically reported KPIs are both value relevant to
investors and useful for predicting future financial performance, which provides evidence that
periodically reported KPIs provide incremental information about the underlying operations of the
firm that is useful for market participants (e.g., Amir and Lev 1996; Behn and Riley 1999; Riley
et al. 2003). Thus, to the degree that KPI guidance is an accurate representation of future
operations, KPI guidance should influence analysts’ expectations about future earnings. Finally,
Givoly et al. (2019) examine analyst forecasts of KPIs and find that analysts revise their forecasts
of earnings when periodically reported KPIs exceed analyst estimates.7 This result provides some
evidence that analysts incorporate information about realized values of KPIs in their estimates of
earnings.
However, there are also reasons why quarterly KPI guidance may not be useful for analysts.
First, despite prior research documenting the value relevance and predictive ability of KPIs, both
investors and regulators have concerns that the subjective nature of KPIs may render them of little
use or may even mislead investors in their evaluation of firm performance.8 Because managers
may have greater discretion in their measurement of reported KPIs in both guidance and periodic
reports, inconsistent measurement of KPIs could limit the usefulness of quarterly KPI guidance to
analysts. Second, while managers’ information about operations provides them with an

7

Givoly et al. (2019) use publicly available data on analyst estimates of KPIs across the four most covered industries:
airline, oil and gas, retail, and pharmaceutical firms.
8
See The Pitfalls of Non-GAAP Metrics available at: https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/the-pitfalls-of-non-gaapmetrics/

3

information advantage in forecasting KPIs, prior research documents that managers also have
incentives to provide inaccurate or misleading guidance (e.g., Rogers and Stocken 2005). Thus,
whether quarterly KPI guidance improves analysts' forecasts of earnings is an empirical question.
To examine the determinants of quarterly KPI guidance and whether quarterly KPI
guidance improves analyst forecasts of earnings, I use a sample of 457 firm-quarter observations
from 2008 through 2017 in the airline industry. I focus on the airline industry because unlike other
industries where the decision to report periodic KPIs is voluntary, firms in the airline industry are
required to provide periodic reports of actual KPIs to regulators and market participants. Thus, this
setting allows me to investigate a manager’s decision to provide quarterly KPI guidance in a setting
that holds constant their decision to provide periodic reports of KPIs. In addition, the airline
industry is historically difficult to evaluate due because firm performance is often both seasonal
and volatile, thus, market participants are likely to benefit from increased disclosure. I identify
three prominent KPIs reported in the airline industry: available seat miles (ASM), revenue per
available seat mile (RASM), and costs per available seat mile (CASM). ASM are measured as the
number of seats available for sale multiplied by the number of miles flown, thus, ASM provides a
measure of an airline’s capacity. RASM is measured as total revenues scaled by ASM and provides
a measure of unit revenues while CASM is measured as total costs excluding fuel scaled by ASM
which provides a measure of unit costs.9 To construct a measure of KPI guidance for each firmquarter observation, I hand collect quarterly KPI guidance from firm filings reported on the
Security and Exchange Comission’s (SEC) EDGAR website and find that 298 or 65% of firms
provide quarterly KPI guidance for at least one KPI in my sample. In addition, I find that disclosure

9

Firms provide periodic disclosures of CASM both including fuel costs and excluding fuel costs (CASM ex-fuel).
However, because fuel costs are difficult for managers to predict, managers often only provide guidance for CASM
ex-fuel so I focus on CASM ex-fuel and refer to this measure as CASM throughout the manuscript. In addition, all
firms in my sample that provide guidance on CASM including fuel also provide guidance for CASM ex-fuel.

4

of quarterly KPI guidance is increasing significantly over my sample from 41% of firms providing
quarterly KPI guidance in 2008 up to 98% in 2017.
I first examine determinants of quarterly KPI guidance and determinants using two
outcomes: the probability of providing quarterly guidance for at least one KPI (i.e., ASM, RASM,
or CASM) and the number of KPIs that a firm provides. I find that firms are more likely to provide
quarterly guidance for at least one KPI when they are smaller, experiencing low growth, and have
higher analyst following. In addition, I find that firms are more likely to provide KPI guidance and
provide for firms when initial analyst EPS forecast errors are large, which provides some evidence
that managers provide guidance on KPIs when analyst uncertainty is high.
I next examine whether there is a reduction in analyst forecast errors for firms that provide
quarterly KPI guidance. To test this, I measure the change in analyst earnings forecast errors as
the difference between the absolute value of the last consensus analyst EPS forecast error prior to
the end of the fiscal quarter and the absolute value initial consensus analyst EPS forecast error
earnings forecast.10 Consistent with quarterly KPI guidance providing useful information to
analysts for estimating future financial performance, I find a larger reduction in analyst forecast
errors for firm-quarters when management provides quarterly KPI guidance relative to firmquarters without quarterly KPI guidance. Although this test allows me to examine whether firms
that provide quarterly KPI guidance experience larger reductions in analyst EPS forecast errors,
because managers are more likely to provide quarterly KPI guidance when initial analyst EPS
forecast errors are large, it is not clear whether this reduction results in more accurate analyst

10

In my sample, all quarterly KPI guidance is announced after the initial consensus analyst EPS forecasts are made
and before the last consensus analyst EPS forecasts are made.
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forecasts of EPS at the end of the period.11 Thus, I next test whether quarterly KPI guidance is
associated with lower analyst EPS forecast errors at the end of the quarter and find a negative
association between quarterly KPI guidance and analyst EPS forecast errors at the end of the
period. Together, these results provide evidence that analyst EPS forecasts improve following
quarterly KPI guidance and this improvement leads to more accurate analyst EPS forecasts at the
end of the fiscal quarter.
I perform two additional tests to examine whether the properties of quarterly KPI guidance
impact the association between quarterly KPI guidance and analyst EPS forecast errors. First, I
examine whether the association between quarterly KPI guidance and analyst forecasts errors is
more pronounced when managers provide quarterly KPI guidance alongside quarterly earnings
guidance (i.e., bundled guidance) relative to firms that provide stand-alone KPI guidance. I find
both bundled quarterly KPI guidance and stand-alone quarterly KPI guidance are associated with
larger reductions in analyst forecast errors relative to firm-quarters without quarterly KPI
guidance, however, I do not find evidence that bundled KPI guidance is associated with a larger
reduction relative to stand-alone KPI guidance. In contrast, I do find evidence that analyst EPS
forecast errors at the end of the quarter are lower for firms with bundled forecasts relative to firms
that provide stand-alone quarterly guidance and analyst EPS forecast errors at the end of the quarter
are lower for both forms of quarterly KPI guidance relative to firms that do not disclose quarterly
KPI guidance.

11

For example, if average absolute analyst EPS forecast errors for firms that provide a quarterly KPI forecast are
initially 15% of share price and are revised to 10% of share price by the end of the quarter while absolute analyst EPS
forecast errors for firms that do not provide quarterly KPI forecasts are initially 10% of share price and are revised to
8% of share price by the end of the quarter, I would observe a larger reduction in analyst forecast errors for quarterly
KPI guidance firms, however, the final analyst estimate would still be more accurate for firms that do not provide
quarterly KPI guidance.

6

Second, I examine whether the association between quarterly KPI guidance and analyst
forecast errors varies when managers forecast point estimates of KPIs in quarterly KPI guidance
relative to range forecasts of KPIs in quarterly KPI guidance. I find no difference in analyst EPS
forecast errors between the point and range KPI guidance, however, both forms of KPI guidance
exhibit larger reductions in analyst EPS forecast errors and lower analyst EPS forecast errors prior
to the end of the quarter relative to firms that do not provide quarterly KPI guidance.
This study contributes to the literature examining voluntary disclosure and, more
specifically, to the literature examining management guidance. To date, research on management
guidance has primarily focused on quarterly and annual guidance of earnings.12 In contrast, this
study focuses on an alternative form of guidance: quarterly KPI guidance and provides evidence
that analyst earnings forecasts are more accurate in quarters when management provides quarterly
KPI guidance. In addition, this study contributes to the debate on the value relevance of KPI in
evaluating firm performance because, unlike prior studies which focus primarily on periodic
reporting of KPIs (e.g., Amir and Lev 1996; Behn and Riley 1999; Hughes 2000; Rajgopal et al.
2003; Riley et al. 2003), my results provide evidence that managers may be able to use quarterly
KPI guidance as a mechanism to reduce information asymmetry between insiders and analysts.
Finally, given the proliferation of firms providing guidance on KPIs, my findings should be of
interest to investors who follow firms that provide quarterly KPI guidance and regulators who are
evaluating the relative costs and benefits of supplementing financial information with KPIs in
financial statements.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section II discusses prior literature
and develops my expectations. Section III describes my sample selection and variable

12

See Hirst et al. (2008) for a review of the management earnings guidance literature.

7

measurement, Section IV describes my research design, Section V discusses my empirical results,
and Section IV provides a summary and conclusion.

8

2. Prior Literature and Development of Expectations
Determinants of Quarterly KPI Guidance
Following the release of a report by the CFA Institute and Business Roundtable Institute
arguing that quarterly earnings guidance leads to managerial myopia and with continued pressure
from investors and consultants to reduce quarterly earnings guidance, many firms are abandoning
the practice of providing quarterly earnings guidance to market particiapnts (CFA Institute 2006).
However, while quarterly earnings guidance is in decline, more firms are beginning to provide
quarterly KPI guidance. Because prior studies examining voluntary disclosure typically focus on
the determinants of management guidance for financial measures such as earnings, revenues, and
cash flows, I first explore the determinants of management providing quarterly KPI guidance to
provide insights into the types of firms that provide this disclosure.
First, I identify factors external to the firm that may influence a manager's decision to
provide quarterly KPI guidance. Prior research provides evidence that a firm’s voluntary
disclosures are influenced by analysts’ demands for information (Chapman and Green 2018). For
example, Chapman and Green (2018) use textual analysis of conference calls and find that
managers are more likely to provide continued forward-looking guidance on items that analysts
request in the conference call. In addition. Thus, to the extent that managers use quarterly KPI
guidance to reduce analyst uncertainty, I expect a positive association between quarterly KPI
guidance and initial analyst EPS forecast errors. Next, I examine whether analyst following is
associated with quarterly KPI guidance because prior studies document that analysts are more
likely to follow firms with a transparent reporting environment (Healy et al. 1999; Graham et al.
2005; Hutton, Lee, and Shu 2012). Thus, to the extent that KPI guidance provides useful
information to analysts in forming expectations about future firm performance, I expect a positive

9

association between quarterly KPI guidance and analyst following. Next, I examine whether
institutional ownership is associated with quarterly KPI guidance. While prior studies generally
find that institutional ownership is higher for firms that provide earnings guidance (e.g., Healy et
al. 1999; Anilowski et al. 2007), Bushee and Noe (2000) find that only ownership by transient
institutions and quasi-indexers is higher for guiding firms. Therefore, I do not make a prediction
on the association between institutional ownership and quarterly KPI guidance.
I next identify firm-level characteristics that may influence a manager’s decision to provide
quarterly KPI guidance. First, I examine whether managers’ decision to provide quarterly earnings
guidance is associated with a managers’ decision to provide quarterly KPI guidance. There may
be a positive association between quarterly earnings guidance and quarterly KPI guidance because
managers may supplement forward-looking financial information with KPIs to provide additional
context to investors and analysts about the underlying operations of the firm that contribute to
management’s expectations of future earnings. However, given the downward trend of quarterly
KPI guidance and the increasing trend of quarterly KPI guidance, firms may be substituting
quarterly KPI guidance in the place of quarterly earnings guidance. Thus, I make no prediction for
the association between quarterly earnings guidance and quarterly KPI guidance.
Next, I examine whether firm growth is associated with quarterly KPI guidance. On one
hand, managers of growing firms may be more likely to provide quarterly KPI guidance because
prior literature documents that managers are more forthcoming with voluntary disclosure when
growth prospects are high (Atiase et al. 2005; Hollander et al. 2010). On the other hand, prior
research also provides evidence that firms with high growth also face higher proprietary costs for
providing quarterly earnings guidance (Verrecchia 1983; Ajinkya et al. 2005). However, to the
extent that quarterly KPI guidance has a lower proprietary cost to managers relative to quarterly

10

earnings guidance, I expect there will be a positive association between firm growth and quarterly
KPI guidance. Finally, I examine whether prior period performance is associated with a manager’s
decision to provide quarterly KPI guidance. While prior literature generally finds that firm
performance is positively associated with the managers’ decision to provide quarterly earnings
guidance (e.g., Miller 2002; Houston et al. 2010), however, managers be more likely to provide
quarterly KPI guidance in an effort to contextualize poor prior performance or use quarterly KPI
guidance to emphasize the relative importance of periodic KPI reporting relative to earnings in
upcoming periods, therefore I do not make a prediction for the association between firm
performance and quarterly KPI guidance.
Quarterly KPI Guidance and Analyst Forecasts
In my second set of tests, I examine whether quarterly KPI guidance results in
improvements in quarterly analyst EPS forecasts. Quarterly KPI guidance should provide useful
information for analysts in forming their estimates of quarterly earnings for several reasons. First,
prior research finds evidence that analysts incorporate information from management earnings
guidance in their estimates. For example, Waymire (1986) finds evidence that annual earnings
guidance by managers is more accurate than the consensus analyst forecast preceding management
guidance, however, following the release of management earnings guidance, analyst earnings
forecast errors are reduced and analyst earnings forecast errors are no different than management
earnings guidance errors. In addition, Baginsky and Hassell (1990) find that analysts revise their
annual earnings forecasts in response to management earnings guidance and the magnitude of their
revision is associated with the returns around the release of the management earnings guidance. In
addition, Williams (1996) finds that analyst earnings forecast revisions following management
earnings guidance are higher when management earnings guidance in prior periods is more

11

accurate. Thus, to the extent that quarterly KPI guidance is useful for predicting future earnings
and management provides accurate estimates of future realizations of KPIs, quarterly KPI
guidance should improve analyst estimates of earnings.
Second, prior research provides evidence that managers have an information advantage
over analysts when reported performance is driven by firm operations rather than macroeconomic
shocks (Hutton et al. 2012). Specifically, Hutton et al. (2012) argue that because managers are able
to observe the daily operations of a firm, managers will provide more accurate forecasts than
analysts when a firm’s future financial performance is more directly tied to the internal operations
of the firm. Consistent with this, Hutton et al. (2012) find that management earnings guidance is
more accurate relative to analyst forecasts when firms experience shocks to their operations in the
prior period such as excess capacity or increases in abnormal inventory. Because quarterly KPI
guidance provides analysts with management’s expectations about the firm’s internal operations,
quarterly KPI guidance should lower any information asymmetry between managers and analysts
resulting in improved analyst estimates of earnings.
Third, although my study is the first to examine forward-looking disclosures of KPIs, prior
research examines periodically reported KPIs and find evidence that periodically reported KPIs
are value relevant to investors and are useful for predicting future financial performance. For
example, Amir and Lev (1996) examine periodic disclosures of KPIs in the telecommunications
industry and find that, while there is no association between stand-alone financial performance
and returns for these firms, there is an association between population coverage and market
penetration (two prominent KPIs in the telecommunications industry) and returns. Furthermore,
subsequent research finds that periodically reported KPIs are also value relevant for firms in the
electric utility industry (Hughes 2000), the e-commerce industry (Trueman et al. 2000), the

12

manufacturing industry (Rajgopal et al. 2003), and the airline industry (Riley et al. 2003; Francis
et al. 2003).
In addition to the value relevance of KPIs, prior research also finds that periodically
reported KPIs are useful for predicting future financial performance. Most related to my study,
Behn and Riley (1999) examine periodic reports of KPIs in the airline industry and find that ASM,
on-time arrival rates, mishandled baggage, and customer satisfaction are associated with future
earnings and revenue.13 Similar to the literature examining the value relevance of periodically
reported KPIs, prior research documents that reported KPIs are useful for predicting future
financial performance across a variety of industries. For example, prior research finds that
periodically reported KPIs are useful for predicting future financial performance in the retail
industry (Ittner and Larcker 1998), the internet industry (Rajgopal et al. 2002), and the
manufacturing industry (Rajgopal et al. 2003). Finally, Brazel et al. (2009) find evidence that
inconsistencies between financial performance and KPIs are a leading indicator of fraud. Thus, to
the extent that quarterly KPI guidance provides analysts with accurate estimates of future
realizations of KPIs, quarterly KPI guidance should improve analyst estimates of earnings.
Finally, prior research documents that analysts use KPIs in forming their expectations of
future earnings. Chandra et al. (1999) examine the semiconductor industry and find evidence that
analysts revise their sales forecasts in response to an industry-wide KPI provided by a trade
association, consistent with analysts incorporating information from KPIs in their estimates of
future financial performance. In addition, Givoly et al. (2019) examine analyst KPI forecasts in
the airline, oil and gas, retail, and pharmaceutical industries and find evidence that analysts revise

13

Because firms in my sample do not provide forward-looking guidance for on-time arrival rates, mishandled baggage,
and customer satisfaction, I focus on three measures managers commonly provide guidance on in my analyses (i.e.,
ASM, RASM, and CASM).

13

their earnings forecasts in response to KPI surprises, consistent with analysts incorporating
information from realized KPIs in their earnings forecasts.
However, there are also reasons why quarterly KPI guidance may not be useful for analysts
in forming expectations of future financial performance. First, although prior research generally
documents a positive association between periodically reported KPIs and future financial
performance, a common criticism of KPIs is that management discretion in measuring KPIs
reduces the informativeness of the disclosure. For example, SEC Chairman Jay Clayton stated that
“A point of investor frustration that we can be cognizant of is when non-GAAP numbers and KPIs
move around in terms of how they are calculated”.14 Thus, inconsistent measurement of KPIs over
time and across firms could limit the usefulness of KPI disclosures. Furthermore, if managers use
inconsistent measures of KPIs in their quarterly KPI guidance, then quarterly KPI guidance could
be of limited use to analysts in forecasting earnings. Second, although managers are in a position
to more accurately forecast KPIs relative to analysts, prior research provides evidence that, in
certain situations, managers have incentives to provide inaccurate or misleading guidance (Rogers
and Stocken 2005). Together, the increased management discretion in measuring KPIs in quarterly
KPI guidance along with incentives to provide inaccurate guidance could contribute to there being
no association between quarterly KPI guidance and analyst forecast errors.

14

See SEC Urges Consistency in Non-GAAP Reporting available at:
https://www.journalofaccountancy.com/news/2018/dec/sec-urges-consistency-non-gaap-reporting-201820253.html
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3. Sample and Research Setting
I begin my sample with all public firms in the airline industry (SIC code 4512) available
from Compustat for the fiscal years 2008 through 2017. I use the Compustat Industry Specific
Quarterly database to obtain data on KPIs for the airline industry and restrict the sample to firms
with non-missing values for ASMs, CASM, and RASM. In addition, because I examine analyst
forecast revisions to quarterly KPI guidance, I obtain data on analyst forecasts from IBES and
require firms have at least two analyst earnings forecasts for each quarter.15
Next, I hand-collect data on quarterly guidance of ASM, RASM, and CASM from Form
8-K disclosures reported on the SEC’s EDGAR website. I examine every 8-K filing filed between
the fiscal quarter-end date and one year prior to the fiscal quarter-end to identify the most recent
quarterly ASM, RASM, and CASM guidance for each firm if available.16 Because I am interested
in examining the impact of quarterly KPI guidance on analyst forecast errors, for firm-quarters
that provide quarterly KPI guidance, I require there be a consensus analyst forecast of EPS prior
to the announcement of KPI guidance and a consensus analyst forecast of EPS following the
announcement of quarterly KPI guidance. In addition, for each firm-quarter with quarterly KPI
guidance, I collect management’s estimates for ASM, RASM, and CASM if available. I find that
quarterly KPI guidance is most often disclosed in monthly traffic reports and earnings
announcements for prior quarters.17 In addition, firms sometimes provide quarterly KPI guidance

15

The results are qualitatively similar for all other variables when I remove analyst forecast errors and analyst forecast
horizon from my determinants test and do not restrict the sample to firms with at least two analyst forecasts.
16
Although I search up to one year prior to the fiscal quarter end for the existence of quarterly KPI guidance, the
longest forecast horizon in my sample is 101 days between the announcement of quarterly KPI guidance and the fiscalquarter end.
17
Monthly traffic reports are an industry-specific disclosure for firms in the airline industry. Firms are required to file
monthly traffic reports disclosures to the Department of Transport and the Bureau of Transportation Statistics. In
addition, I find that airline firms also regulary file monthly traffic reports on the SEC EDGAR website in a Form 8-K
disclosure.
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in a standalone press release or as part of a Reg FD disclosure following an investor meeting,
however, these methods of disclosure are less common.
I examine quarterly KPI guidance in the airline industry for several reasons. First, prior to
the passage of the Airline Deregulation Act in 1978, the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT)
began requiring that all airlines operating aircraft designed for 60 passengers or more to
periodically report their actual air traffic (e.g., ASM and cargo capacity) on a monthly basis. This
data were initially used by the Civil Aeronautics Board (a predecessor to the Federal Aviation
Administration) to evaluate the capabilities of U.S. airlines and to allocate routes and set fares for
domestic travel. However, following the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, airlines were allowed
to compete in a free market and these KPIs were then used by investors and creditors in evaluating
the operating performance of airlines.18
Second, unlike industries where actual KPIs are reported on a voluntary basis, historical
data on KPIs are required to be filed with the DOT for firms in the airline industry, thus, I am
better able to isolate the impact of quarterly KPI guidance rather than evaluating firms that
voluntarily provide quarterly KPI guidance conditional on also voluntarily providing actual KPIs
for prior periods. Finally, the DOT requires that airlines measure actual KPIs reported in historical
traffic reports using a specified criterion, which lowers management’s discretion in reporting
realized KPIs to investors. Together, these factors allow me to evaluate the determinants and
consequences of quarterly KPI guidance in an industry where there is a consistent measurement of
actual KPIs across firms.

For example, in the Standard & Poor’s Corporate Rating Criteria, they list ASM, RASM, and CASM as important
rating factors that they consider when evaluating the operating performance of airlines. Available at:
https://www.standardandpoors.com/en_US/web/guest/article/-/view/sourceId/8450161
18

16

Table 1 Panel A provides descriptive statistics for firms in my sample.19 Across my sample
period, I find that 67% of firms provide quarterly KPI guidance. Figure 1 presents the percentage
of observations that provide quarterly KPI guidance by year. I find that the percentage of firms
providing KPI guidance increase over my sample period from 44% of firm-quarters in 2008 to
98% of firm quarters in 2017. Table 1 Panel B compares firm characteristics for firm-quarters with
quarterly KPI guidance relative to firm-quarters without quarterly KPI guidance. Univariate tests
reveal that quarterly KPI guidance firm-quarters have lower analyst forecast errors, are less likely
to provide earnings guidance, have higher analyst following, higher institutional ownership, higher
growth prospects, higher prior operating performance, lower leverage, and are larger. While these
descriptive statistics provide some insight on the cross-sectional attributes of firms that provide
quarterly KPI guidance, in subsequent analyses, I include year fixed effects to control for industrywide changes in KPI guidance activity over time and quarter fixed effects to control for seasonality.
I also include firm fixed effects to control for time-invariant firm characteristics that could impact
a firm’s decision to issue quarterly KPI guidance.
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All variables are defined in Appendix A.
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4. Research Design
Determinants of Quarterly KPI Guidance
In order to examine the determinants of quarterly KPI guidance, I first estimate the
following model:
KPIGuidanceit = α0 + α1Abs(Initial Analyst EPS Error)it + α2Earnings Guidanceit
+ α3Log(Analyst Following)it-1 + α4InstOwnit-1 + α5BtMit-1 + α6ROAit-1
+ α7Lossit-1 + α8Leverageit-1 + α9Sizeit-1 + α10 Initial Analyst Horizonit
+ αiFirmFEi + αsYearFE + αtQuarterFE + εit

(1)

Where KPIGuidance is an indicator variable equal to one when a firm provides quarterly KPI
guidance for quarter t. The coefficients of interest in Equation (1) are α1 through α7 which represent
the coefficients on the variables identified in Section II as potential determinants of quarterly KPI
guidance. In addition to the variables identified in Section II, I also control for leverage, firm size,
and the initial analyst forecast horizon.
Next, to examine the determinants of the number of KPIs that firms provide in their
quarterly KPI guidance, I estimate the following model:
Num KPIGuidanceit = β0 + β1Abs(Initial Analyst EPS Error)it + β2Earnings Guidanceit
+ β3Log(Analyst Following)it-1 + β4InstOwnit-1 + β5BtMit-1 + β6ROAit-1
+ β7Lossit-1 + β8Leverageit-1 + β9Sizeit-1 + β10 Initial Analyst Horizonit
+ βiFirmFEi + βsYearFE + βtQuarterFE + υit

(2)

Where Num KPIGuidance is measured as the number of unique KPIs that a firm forecasts in its
quarterly KPI guidance. This variable ranges from 0, if a firm provides no quarterly KPI guidance,
to 3 if a firm provides guidance for all three KPIs in their quarterly KPI guidance (i.e., ASM,
RASM, and CASM). The coefficients of interest in Equation (2) are β1 through β7 which allows
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me to examine whether the same factors that influence a firm’s decision to provide quarterly KPI
guidance also influence the number of items that a firm forecasts in its quarterly KPI guidance.
Quarterly KPI Guidance and Analyst Forecast Errors
In order to test whether quarterly KPI guidance is associated with reductions in analyst
forecast errors, I estimate the following model:
ΔAbs(Analyst EPS Error) = θ0 + θ1KPIGuidance / Num KPIGuidance + θ2Earnings Guidanceit
+ θ3Log(Analyst Following)it-1 + θ4InstOwnit-1 + θ5BtMit-1 + θ6ROAit-1
+ θ7Lossit-1 + θ8Leverageit-1 + θ9Sizeit-1 + θ10 Last Analyst Horizonit
+ θ10 Initial Analyst Horizonit + θ10Analyst Forecast Distanceit
+ θiFirmFEi + θsYearFE + θtQuarterFE + μt

(3)

Where ΔAbs(Analyst EPS Error) is measured as the difference between the absolute value of the
last analyst EPS forecast error and the absolute value of the initial analyst EPS forecast error.
Because analysts can incorporate more information into their EPS forecast when I include Last
Analyst Horizon to control for the number of days between the last consensus analyst EPS forecast
and the fiscal quarter end, Initial Analyst Horizon to control for the number of days between the
initial consensus analyst EPS forecast and the fiscal quarter end date, and Analyst Forecast
Distance to control for the number of days between the initial consensus analyst EPS forecast and
the last analyst EPS forecast. The coefficient of interest in Equation (3) is θ1, which captures the
association between the presence of quarterly KPI guidance (KPIGuidance) or the number of KPIs
forecasted in quarterly KPI guidance (Num KPIGuidance) and the change in analyst forecast errors
for EPS.
Although Equation (3) allows me to examine whether firms that provide quarterly KPI
guidance experience greater reductions in analyst EPS forecast errors, it is not clear whether this
reduction results in more accurate analyst forecasts of EPS. For example, if managers provide
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quarterly KPI guidance in response to inaccurate initial analyst EPS estimates of future earnings
then a reduction in analyst forecast errors may not result in more accurate anlyst EPS estimates.
Thus, in order to examine whether quarterly KPI guidance is associated with lower analyst forecast
errors following the release of quarterly KPI guidance, I estimate the following model:
Abs(Last Analyst EPS Error) = δ0 + δ1KPIGuidance / Num KPIGuidance
+ δ2Earnings Guidanceit + δ3Log(Analyst Following)it-1 + δ4InstOwnit-1
+ δ5BtMit-1 + δ6ROAit-1 + δ7Lossit-1 + δ8Leverageit-1 + δ9Sizeit-1
+ δ10 Last Analyst Horizonit + δiFirmFEi + δsYearFE + δtQuarterFE + ηt (4)
Where Abs(Last Analyst EPS Error) is the absolute value of actual EPS less the last consensus
analyst EPS prior to the end of the fiscal quarter.20 The coefficient of interest in Equation (4) is δ1,
which captures the association between the presence of quarterly KPI guidance and the level of
the consensus analyst EPS forecast errors. Because initial analyst EPS errors are larger for firms
that provide quarterly KPI guidance, this test allows me to examine whether the reduction in
analyst forecast errors following quarterly KPI guidance documented in Equation (3) is large
enough to overcome these initially higher analyst EPS forecast errors and whether it results in
more accurate analyst EPS forecasts at the end of the fiscal quarter relative to firm-quarters without
KPI guidance.
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I use the consensus prior to the end of the quarter rather than the earnings announcement date to avoid including
analyst estimates that are made after earnings or KPI preannouncements by management following the end of the
fiscal quarter.
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5. Empirical Results
Determinants of Quarterly KPI Guidance
Table 2 presents the results from estimating Equation (1) to examine the determinants of
quarterly KPI guidance. In Column (1), where the dependent variable is an indicator variable equal
to one when a firm provides quarterly KPI guidance for at least one KPI, the coefficient on
Abs(Initial Analyst EPS Error) is positive and significant (α1 = 0.258 p = 0.004), indicating that
firms are more likely to provide quarterly KPI guidance following inaccurate initial analyst
estimates of earnings. This result provides some evidence that managers may use quarterly KPI
guidance to provide analysts with additional information about the operations of the firm to reduce
analyst earnings forecast errors.21 Consistent with managers providing quarterly KPI guidance
when there is a greater demand for information from analysts, the coefficient on Log(Analyst
Following) is positive and significant (α3 = 0.275 p = 0.000). I also find that the coefficient on BtM
is negative and significant (α5 = -0.046 p = 0.001), indicating that firms are more likely to provide
quarterly KPI guidance when growth prospects are high. While the coefficient on ROA is not
significant (α6 = 0.102 p = 0.818), the coefficient on Loss is positive and significant (α7 = 0.157 p
= 0.000). Thus, while I find no evidence of an association between the level of prior period earnings
and a firm’s quarterly KPI guidance decision, firms are more likely to provide quarterly KPI
guidance when they experience a loss in the prior quarter.
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This is consistent with anecdotal observations of management providing quarterly KPI guidance following analyst
stock upgrades. For example, on August 29th, analysts at Deutche Bank state that JetBlue had “[a] good balance
sheet, solid market position, primarily domestic operator and costs under control as it is on track to achieve it flat to
1% 2018 - 2020 CASM CAGR goal.” See Here are the biggest analyst calls of the day:Monster, JetBlue & More
Available at: https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/28/monster-jetblue-papa-johns-autodesk-are-analyst-calls-of-theday.html. However, on September 4th, JetBlue released quarterly KPI guidance that showed that while CASM growth
was expected to be in line with Deutche Bank’s expectations, RASM was expected to fall below expectations. See
JetBlue slides after lowing guidance on Dorian impact, demand concerns Available at:
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/04/jetblue-slides-after-lowering-guidance-on-dorian-demand-concerns.html.
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Table 2 Column (2) presents the results from estimating Equation (2), which examines the
determinants of the number of KPIs that a firm forecasts in its KPI guidance. In general, the results
are consistent with the results documented in Table 2 Column (1) where I examine the
determinants of firms providing quarterly KPI guidance for at least one KPI. Specifically, I find a
positive association for Abs(Initial Analyst EPS Error) (β1 = 0.308 p = 0.050),
Log(AnalystFollowing) (β3 = 0.779 p = 0.000), and Loss (β7 = 0.267 p = 0.001) and a negative
association for BtM (β5 = -0.085 p = 0.002) and the number of items forecasted in a firm’s quarterly
KPI guidance. Together, these results indicate that the same determinants that influence a
manager’s decision to issue quarterly KPI guidance also influence the number of items that
managers forecast in their quarterly KPI guidance.
Quarterly KPI Guidance and Analyst Forecast Errors
Table 3 presents the results from estimating Equation (3), which investigates the
association between quarterly KPI guidance and changes in absolute analyst EPS forecast errors.
In Column (1), where the variable of interest is KPIGuidance, I find a negative and significant
coefficient on KPIGuidance (θ1 = -0.026 p = 0.005), consistent with larger reductions in analyst
EPS forecast errors when firms provide quarterly KPI guidance in the period between the initial
analyst EPS forecast and the last analyst EPS forecast. Consistent with the results in Column (1),
I also find a negative and significant coefficient on Num KPIGuidance (θ1 = -0.006 p = 0.041).
This result indicates that not only is the presence of quarterly KPI guidance associated with
reductions in analyst EPS forecast errors but the number of items that managers forecast in their
quarterly KPI guidance is also associated with reductions in analyst EPS forecast errors.
Table 4 presents the results from estimating Equation (4), which investigates whether
quarterly KPI guidance is associated with the absolute value of the last consensus analyst EPS
estimate prior to the end of the fiscal quarter. In Column (1), the coefficient on KPIGuidance is
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negative and significant (δ1 = -0.025 p = 0.053). Although firms are more likely to provide
quarterly KPI guidance when initial analyst EPS forecast errors are larger, this result indicates that
the reduction in analyst forecast errors quarter for firms that provide quarterly KPI guidance
documented in Table 3 is large enough to overcome these higher initial analyst EPS forecast errors
which results in more accurate analyst forecasts of EPS at the end of the fiscal quarter. Consistent
with the results documented in Column (1) the coefficient on Num KPIGuidance is also negative
and significant (δ1 = -0.007 p = 0.023) in Column (2).
Additional Analyses
Bundled Quarterly KPI and Earnings Guidance and Analyst Forecast Errors
Prior literature finds that the value relevance of management guidance varies with the
amount of additional information accompanying earnings guidance. For example, Hutton et al.
(2003) find that there is a larger market reaction to upward revisions in management earnings
guidance when the guidance is accompanied by qualitative narrative disclosures. Thus, I next test
whether the association between quarterly KPI guidance and analyst forecast errors varies when
managers provide quarterly KPI guidance alongside quarterly earnings guidance (i.e., bundled KPI
guidance). Specifically, because quarterly KPI guidance provides analysts with information about
management decisions that contribute to future financial performance, bundled KPI guidance may
be incrementally informative to stand-alone quarterly KPI guidance in helping analysts revise their
forecasts.22 To test this, I estimate Equations (3) and (4) including an interaction between
KPIGuidance (Num KPIGuidance) and Earnings Guidance.
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For example, a firm in the airline industry that supplements quarterly earnings guidance with quarterly KPI guidance
can provide analysts with information about whether they plan to meet this target through increasing ASM, increasing
RASM, or decreasing CASM.
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Table 5 presents the results from estimating Equation (3) including the interaction term,
KPIGuidance(Num KPIGuidance)*Earnings Guidance. While I continue to find a significant
association between quarterly KPI guidance and reductions in analyst EPS forecast errors in
Columns (1) and (2) (θ1 = -0.026 p = 0.007; θ1 = -0.006 p = 0.043), I do not find a significant
association between the interaction term KPIGuidance(Num KPIGuidance)*Earnings Guidance
and changes in analyst EPS forecast errors (θ2 = -0.005 p = 0.383; θ2 = -0.003 p = 0.296). This test
reveals that the reduction in analyst EPS forecast errors for firms that provide quarterly KPI
guidance does not vary between firm-quarters when managers provide stand-alone quarterly KPI
guidance and firm-quarters when managers provide bundled KPI and earnings guidance.
Table 6 presents the results from estimating Equation (4) including the interaction term,
KPIGuidance(Num KPIGuidance)*Earnings Guidance. The coefficient on KPIGuidance
(Num KPIGuidance) is negative and significant (δ1 = -0.023 p = 0.073; δ1 = -0.007 p = 0.026),
consistent lower analyst EPS forecast errors at the end of the fiscal quarter for firm-quarters when
management provides stand-alone quarterly KPI guidance. In addition, the coefficient on the
interaction term, KPIGuidance(Num KPIGuidance)*Earnings Guidance is also negative and
significant (δ2 = -0.021 p = 0.066; δ2 = -0.009 p = 0.070). This result indicates that while the
reduction in analyst EPS forecast errors is no different for stand-alone KPI guidance and bundled
KPI guidance, analyst EPS forecast errors are lower at the end of the quarter in firm-quarters when
management provides bundled KPI and earnings guidance.
Quarterly KPI Guidance Form and Analyst Forecast Errors
Prior literature finds evidence that management earnings guidance is more informative
when managers provide forecasts of point estimates of earnings relative to when they provide a
range forecast (Baginski et al. 1993; Hughes and Pae 2004). Thus, to the extent that managers are
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more likely to report point estimates in quarterly KPI guidance when they are more certain that the
KPI target will be realized in the future, the association between quarterly KPI guidance and
reductions in analyst EPS forecast errors should be greater for point forecasts relative to range
forecasts of KPIs. To test this, I create two indicator variables, KPIGuidance_Point
(KPIGuidance_Range), set equal to one when managers provide point estimates (range forecasts)
in their quarterly KPI guidance. Next I estimate Equations (3) and (4) and replace KPIGuidance
with the KPIGuidance_Point and KPIGuidance_Range. In untabulated results, I find a negative
and significant coefficient on both KPIGuidance_Point and KPIGuidance_Range in both models.
Furthermore, although the magnitude of the negative coefficient is larger for KPIGuidance_Point
relative to KPIGuidance_Range, an F-test reveals that the coefficients are not statistically different
in either model.
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6. Conclusion
In this study, I examine the determinants and consequences of management guidance of
KPIs in the airline industry. Using a sample of 457 firm-quarter observations from 2008 through
2017, I find that, on average, firms are more likely to provide quarterly KPI guidance and a larger
number of KPIs in quarterly KPI guidance when initial analyst EPS forecast errors are large, when
there is higher analyst following, when a firm has higher growth prospects, and when a firm
experiences a loss in the prior quarter. Together, these results provide evidence that managers issue
quarterly KPI guidance in response to analyst uncertainty and when there is a greater demand for
information by analysts. In subsequent tests, I examine whether quarterly KPI guidance is
associated with improvements in analyst forecasts and find that quarterly KPI guidance is
associated with larger reductions in analyst EPS forecast errors relative to firms that do not provide
quarterly KPI guidance which results in lower analyst EPS forecast errors at the end of the fiscal
quarter for firms that provide quarterly KPI guidance. Finally, I find that the negative association
between quarterly KPI guidance and analyst EPS forecast errors at the end of the period is more
pronounced when firms provide bundled quarterly KPI guidance (i.e., quarterly KPI guidance
accompanied by quarterly earnings guidance) relative to stand-alone quarter KPI guidance.
Together, these results provide evidence that managers provide quarterly KPI guidance in
response to inaccurate initial analyst EPS forecasts and, after providing quarterly KPI guidance,
firms experience improvements in analyst forecasts of earnings. In addition, this study provides
evidence that quarterly KPI guidance is a complimentary forward-looking disclosure that
managers can use to improve analyst estimates of earnings. However, I also acknowledge that
because my analyses are conducted in the airline industry, the results may not be generalizable to
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firms in industries without periodic reporting of KPIs or in industries where KPIs are not well
defined.
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions:
Variable
Abs(Initial Analyst EPS Error)

Description
The absolute value of the difference between Actual EPS
and the first consensus analyst EPS forecast for quarter t
scaled by stock price. The first consensus analyst EPS
forecast is measured as the first consensus analyst EPS
forecast made in the year preceding the fiscal quarter end
date.

Abs(Last Analyst EPS Error)

The absolute value of the difference between Actual EPS
and the last consensus analyst EPS forecast for quarter t
scaled by stock price. The last consensus analyst EPS
forecast is measured as the last consensus analyst EPS
forecast made prior to the end of the fiscal quarter.

Log(Analyst Following)

The natural log of the number of unique analysts that
forecast firm i's EPS for quarter t-1.
The number of days between the initial consensus analyst
EPS forecast and the last consensus analyst EPS forecast
for firm i for quarter t.

Analyst Forecast Distance

BtM
Earnings Guidance

The book value of equity divided by the market value of
equity in quarter t-1.
An indicator variable equal to one if firm i provides
guidance for at least one KPI (i.e., ASM, RASM, or
CASM) for quarter t in the previous year, and zero
otherwise.

Initial Analyst Horizon

The number of days between the initial consensus analyst
EPS forecast and the fiscal quarter end date for firm i for
quarter t.

InstOwn

The percentage of outstanding shares owned by
institutional owners.
An indicator variable equal to one if firm i provides
guidance for at least one KPI (i.e., ASM, RASM, or
CASM) for quarter t.

KPIGuidance

Last Analyst Horizon

The number of days between the last consensus analyst
EPS forecast made prior to the end of the fiscal quarter and
the fiscal quarter end date for firm i for quarter t.

Leverage

Long term debt divided by the book value of equity in
quarter t-1.
An indicator variable set equal to one when ROA is
negative in quarter t-1, and 0 otherwise.

Loss
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Num KPIGuidance

The count of the number of unique KPIs forecasted by firm
i in quarterly KPI guidance for quarter t ranging from 0
(i.e., firm i does not provide quarterly KPI guidance for
quarter t) to 3 (i.e., firm i provides quarterly KPI guidance
for ASM, RASM, and CASM for quarter t).

ROA

Income before extraordinary items divided by average total
assets in quarter t-1.
The natural log of total assets in quarter t-1.
Change in absolute analyst EPS forecast errors measured as
the Abs(Last Analyst EPS Error) - Abs(Initial Analyst EPS
Error).

Size
ΔAbs(Analyst EPS Error)
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Figure 1: Percentage of Airline Firms Providing Quarterly KPI
Guidance
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Table 1
Panel A: Summary Statistics
Mean
Std Dev
1%
Median
99%
Variable
0.652
0.477
0.000
1.000
1.000
KPIGuidance
1.560
1.271
0.000
2.000
3.000
Num KPIGuidance
0.050
0.139
0.000
0.009
0.976
Abs(Initial Analyst EPS Error)
0.025
0.104
0.000
0.002
0.788
Abs(Last Analyst EPS Error)
ΔAbs(Analyst EPS Error)
-0.026
0.072
-0.496
-0.005
0.060
0.066
0.248
0.000
0.000
1.000
Earnings Guidance
10.972
4.556
1
12
18
Analyst Following
0.809
0.192
0.000
0.843
1.000
InstOwn
0.987
1.644
0.021
0.469
12.412
BtM
0.009
0.027
-0.118
0.008
0.084
ROA
0.212
0.409
0.000
0.000
1.000
Loss
0.336
0.157
0.013
0.346
0.672
Leverage
8.683
1.508
2.964
8.675
10.884
Size
307.302
47.395
42
317
350
Initial Analyst Horizon
19.009
15.647
11
16
105
Last Analyst Horizon
Number of Observations
457
Table 1 Panel A reports the summary statistics for variables in Equations (1) through (4). All continuous variables are winsorized
at the 1st and 99th percentiles.

Panel B: Differences in Means
KPIGuidance = 1
Mean
0.034
0.008
-0.025
0.027
12.399
0.854
0.563
0.013
0.208
0.311
8.951
317.560
16.406

KPIGuidance = 0
Mean
0.080
0.058
-0.026
0.138
8.296
0.723
1.782
0.002
0.220
0.382
8.182
288.075
23.887

Difference
p-value
Variable
-0.046***
(0.005)
Abs(Initial Analyst EPS Error)
-0.050***
(0.000)
Abs(Last Analyst EPS Error)
ΔAbs(Analyst EPS Error)
0.001
(0.931)
-0.112***
(0.000)
Earnings Guidance
4.104***
(0.000)
Analyst Following
0.131***
(0.000)
InstOwn
-1.220***
(0.000)
BtM
0.011**
(0.016)
ROA
-0.012
(0.766)
Loss
-0.071***
(0.000)
Leverage
0.769***
(0.000)
Size
29.485***
(0.001)
Initial Analyst Horizon
-7.481**
(0.026)
Last Analyst Horizon
Number of Observations
298
159
Table 1 Panel B reports univariate statistics for variables in Equations (1) through (4). All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and
99th percentiles. ***, **, and * indicate significant at p < 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively.
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Table 2
Determinants of quarterly KPI Guidance
(1)

(2)
Num
KPIGuidance
KPIGuidance
Abs(Initial Analyst EPS Error)
0.258***
0.308**
(0.004)
(0.050)
Earnings Guidance
(?)
0.056
-0.041
(0.345)
(0.596)
Log(AnalystFollowing)
(+)
0.275***
0.779***
(0.000)
(0.000)
InstOwn
(?)
0.135
-0.279
(0.309)
(0.304)
BtM
(-)
-0.046***
-0.085***
(0.001)
(0.002)
ROA
(?)
0.102
0.939
(0.818)
(0.387)
Loss
(?)
0.157***
0.267***
(0.000)
(0.001)
Leverage
-0.075
0.463
(0.652)
(0.331)
Size
-0.216***
0.300*
(0.004)
(0.084)
Initial Analyst Horizon
0.000
0.000
(0.388)
(0.690)
Constant
2.000***
-3.853**
(0.007)
(0.024)
Year Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Quarter Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Firm Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Observations
457
457
Adjusted R-squared
0.761
0.817
Table 2 Columns 1 and 2 reports the results from estimating Equations (1) and (2),
respectively. p-values are in parentheses below the coefficient estimates and are onetailed for variables with a signed prediction and two-tailed otherwise. ***, **, and *
indicated significance at the p < 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. t-tests are
estimated using cluster robust standard errors clustered at the firm level.
Predicted
Sign
(+)

Table 3
Quarterly KPI Guidance and Changes in Absolute Analyst EPS Forecast Error
(1)
(2)
ΔAbs(Analyst EPS Error)
ΔAbs(Analyst EPS Error)
KPIGuidance

-0.026***
(0.005)

Num KPIGuidance

-0.006**
(0.041)
Earnings Guidance
0.007
0.005
(0.506)
(0.620)
Log(AnalystFollowing)
-0.010
-0.013
(0.623)
(0.553)
InstOwn
-0.029
-0.034
(0.485)
(0.426)
BtM
-0.020**
-0.019**
(0.022)
(0.026)
ROA
0.226
0.228
(0.363)
(0.358)
Loss
-0.009
-0.012
(0.367)
(0.246)
Leverage
-0.047
-0.042
(0.282)
(0.337)
Size
0.040*
0.048**
(0.089)
(0.050)
Last Analyst Horizon
-0.001**
-0.001**
(0.019)
(0.015)
Initial Analyst Horizon
-0.001*
-0.001*
(0.057)
(0.057)
Analyst Forecast Distance
0.001*
0.001*
(0.051)
(0.055)
Constant
-0.279
-0.353*
(0.171)
(0.090)
Year Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Quarter Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Firm Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Observations
457
457
Adjusted R-squared
0.376
0.371
Table 3 reports the results from estimating Equation (3). p-values are in parentheses below the
coefficient estimates and are one-tailed for my variable of interest and two-tailed otherwise. ***, **,
and * indicated significance at the p < 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. t-tests are estimated
using cluster robust standard errors clustered at the firm level.
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Table 4
Quarterly KPI Guidance and Last Absolute Analyst EPS Forecast Error

KPIGuidance

(1)
Abs(Last Analyst EPS Error)
-0.025*
(0.053)

Num KPIGuidance

(2)
Abs(Last Analyst EPS Error)

-0.007**
(0.023)
Earnings Guidance
0.017
0.016
(0.106)
(0.153)
Log(AnalystFollowing)
0.035
0.033
(0.152)
(0.195)
InstOwn
-0.149**
-0.155**
(0.016)
(0.016)
BtM
0.005
0.006
(0.676)
(0.664)
ROA
-0.584
-0.583
(0.213)
(0.215)
Loss
-0.020*
-0.022**
(0.068)
(0.035)
Leverage
-0.011
-0.006
(0.814)
(0.901)
Size
-0.001
0.007
(0.981)
(0.775)
Last Analyst Horizon
-0.001
-0.001
(0.112)
(0.107)
Constant
0.082
0.005
(0.684)
(0.978)
Year Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Quarter Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Firm Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Observations
457
457
Adjusted R-squared
0.396
0.393
Table 4 Columns 1 and 2 reports the results from estimating Equation (4), respectively. p-values are in
parentheses below the coefficient estimates and are one-tailed for my variable of interest and two tailed
otherwise. ***, **, and * indicated significance at the p < 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. t-tests
are estimated using cluster robust standard errors clustered at the firm level.
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Table 5
Quarterly KPI Guidance with Eearnings Guidance and Changes in Absolute Analyst EPS Forecast Error
(1)
(2)
ΔAbs(Analyst EPS Error)
ΔAbs(Analyst EPS Error)
KPIGuidance
-0.026***
(0.007)
KPIGuidance*Earnings Guidance
-0.005
(0.383)
Num KPIGuidance
-0.006**
(0.043)
Num KPIGuidance*Earnings Guidance
-0.003
(0.296)
Earnings Guidance
0.009
0.008
(0.582)
(0.599)
Log(AnalystFollowing)
-0.010
-0.013
(0.615)
(0.546)
InstOwn
-0.029
-0.034
(0.489)
(0.431)
BtM
-0.020**
-0.019**
(0.022)
(0.027)
ROA
0.226
0.229
(0.363)
(0.357)
Loss
-0.009
-0.011
(0.370)
(0.252)
Leverage
-0.047
-0.042
(0.287)
(0.333)
Size
0.040*
0.048**
(0.094)
(0.050)
Last Analyst Horizon
-0.001**
-0.001**
(0.019)
(0.016)
-0.001*
-0.001*
Initial Analyst Horizon
(0.058)
(0.057)
0.001*
0.001*
Analyst Forecast Distance
(0.051)
(0.055)
Constant
-0.277
-0.353*
(0.176)
(0.090)
Year Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Quarter Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Firm Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Observations
457
457
Adjusted R-squared
0.374
0.369
Table 5 reports the results examining quarterly KPI guidance as a compliment to earnings guidance for the last analyst
forecast error. p-values are in parentheses below the coefficient estimates and are one-tailed for my variable of interest
and two-tailed otherwise. ***, **, and * indicated significance at the p < 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. t-tests
are estimated using cluster robust standard errors clustered at the firm level.
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Table 6
Quarterly KPI Guidance with Earnings Guidance and Last Absolute Analyst EPS Forecast Error
(1)
(2)
Abs(Last Analyst EPS Error)
Abs(Last Analyst EPS Error)
KPIGuidance
-0.023*
(0.073)
KPIGuidance*Earnings Guidance
-0.021*
(0.066)
Num KPIGuidance
-0.007**
(0.026)
Num KPIGuidance*Earnings Guidance
-0.009*
(0.070)
Earnings Guidance
0.027*
0.022
(0.092)
(0.126)
Log(AnalystFollowing)
0.034
0.032
(0.163)
(0.202)
InstOwn
-0.148**
-0.154**
(0.017)
(0.017)
BtM
0.005
0.006
(0.671)
(0.661)
ROA
-0.583
-0.581
(0.215)
(0.217)
Loss
-0.020*
-0.022**
(0.071)
(0.038)
Leverage
-0.009
-0.006
(0.842)
(0.890)
Size
-0.002
0.007
(0.944)
(0.774)
Last Analyst Horizon
-0.001
-0.001
(0.112)
(0.108)
Constant
0.093
0.006
(0.645)
(0.976)
Year Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Quarter Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Firm Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Observations
457
457
Adjusted R-squared
0.396
0.392
Table 6 reports the results examining quarterly KPI guidance as a compliment to earnings guidance for the last
analyst forecast error. p-values are in parentheses below the coefficient estimates and are one-tailed for my
variable of interest and two tailed otherwise. ***, **, and * indicated significance at the p < 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10
levels, respectively. t-tests are estimated using cluster robust standard errors clustered at the firm level.
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